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INTRODUCTION 
In 1997, the Federal Circuit decided Sage Products v. Devon,1 in which the court 
appeared to create a new doctrine limiting the scope of the doctrine of equivalents in patent 
infringement cases.  At the time, commentators dubbed this new doctrine “patent drafter 
estoppel”2 and predicted that it would be “a significant development favoring potential 
infringers.”3 In reality, however, the Federal Circuit has backed away from creating such a 
“weapon for alleged infringers,”4 repeatedly holding that its decision in Sage Products 
represented nothing more than a straightforward application of the well-known rule against using 
the doctrine of equivalents to vitiate a claim limitation. 
 This paper will explore the Federal Circuit’s failure to create the patent drafter estoppel 
limitation and will attempt to determine whether the court’s decision was a good one from the 
perspective of advancing relevant patent law policies.  Part I will describe equivalent 
infringement analysis and the policies that are sought to be advanced in the patent law system.  
Part II will examine Sage Products itself.  Part III will discuss the two lines of thought that 
emerged after the Sage Products decision was rendered.  Finally, Part IV will analyze these 
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2conflicting interpretations with respect to their advancement of patent law policy and determine 
why the court’s decision was consistent with patent law policy. 
 
I. GENERAL PATENT LAW BACKGROUND 
A. Policies at Work in Patent Law 
 The United States patent law system is the result of several conflicting policy goals.  
Several policies behind the patent system are dictated by the United States Constitution, while 
others have been developed through case law to keep the system functioning more smoothly. 
 The patent system is provided for in the United States Constitution, which grants 
Congress the power “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
limited Times to . . . Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective . . . Discoveries.”5 The 
grant of power provides the first policy embodied in the patent system: grants of patents must 
“promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts.”6 Generally, this means that the patent system 
must operate in a way that promotes innovation.  Also contained within the grant of 
Congressional power is the patent system’s second policy: by granting to inventors only the 
“Right to their respective . . . Discoveries,”7 the Constitution ensures that the patent system will 
not operate in such a way as to remove knowledge from the public domain.  These twin 
policies—encouraging significant innovation and ensuring that, once available to the public, 
knowledge is never again made the subject of protection—form the constitutional underpinning 
of the United States patent system. 
 
5 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
6 Id. 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (emphasis added). 
3Over time, the courts have refined these policies somewhat, defining several goals for the 
patent system that allow concepts to be evaluated to determine whether they are consistent with 
patent policy.  The goal of encouraging significant technological advances is still alive and well.8
However, this goal is now seen as one half of “a careful balance,” the other side of which is 
encouragement of “imitation and refinement through imitation.”9 All patent policies therefore 
must be interpreted in light of how well they advance the twin goals of encouraging significant 
and pioneering technological advances and encouraging design-around behavior and other 
secondary improvements. 
 The additional goals of the patent system are derived from these two overarching 
principles.  The constitutional mandate to ensure that knowledge once made available to the 
public does not become the subject of patent protection is enforced by a policy that “Congress 
may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent knowledge from 
the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”10 The goal of 
encouraging secondary innovation is advanced by the patent system’s disclosure requirements, 
which require an inventor to divulge enough about his invention to enable others to make and use 
it before gaining protection for the idea.11 The patent system also requires clear enough 
disclosure that the public is made sufficiently aware of the scope of issued patents to avoid 
infringing them when attempting to imitate or design around them.12 
Thus, any new concept that purports to change the patent system for the better must 
support these five general policies, or at least must advance more of them than it retards.  First, it 
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4must encourage primary innovation, significant advances in technology.  Second, it must 
encourage design-around behavior or other secondary innovation.  Third, it must not allow 
knowledge that is already freely available to the public to be removed from the public domain.  
Fourth, it must encourage inventors to disclose the inventions fully in order to give those skilled 
in the art the ability to make and use the invention.  Finally, it must encourage inventors to 
disclose their inventions clearly in order to give adequate public notice of the patent’s existence 
and scope. 
B. Infringement of Patents 
 Once a patent is issued, the inventor (or the person to whom she assigns the patent) has a 
right to exclude others from nearly any use of the patented invention.13 In any case where patent 
infringement is at issue, the courts must grapple with exactly how broad the patent’s scope is and 
whether the alleged infringer’s product falls within that scope. 
 While the determination of a patent’s scope might seem a simple matter of construction, 
there are at least two problems that preclude such a rosy view of the scope determination.  First, 
the language used by the inventor in her patent application may fall short of a perfect description 
of her invention, leading to fights over exactly what the language means.  Even the Federal 
Circuit, whose mission is to create consistency by providing “a forum for appeals from 
throughout the country in areas of the law [such as patent law] where Congress determines that 
there is special need for national uniformity,”14 has not reached consensus on exactly how to 
carry out such a fundamental task as patent claim construction.15 
13 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (“. . . whoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention . . . 
infringes the patent.”). 
14 S. Rep. 97-275 (Nov. 18, 1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 14. 
15 Compare Victronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that all intrinsic 
evidence, including the claim language, the patent specification, and the patent’s prosecution history, must be 
evaluated before turning to extrinsic evidence, such as dictionary definitions or expert testimony) with EMI Group 
North America, Inc. v. Intel Corp., 157 F.3d 887 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (holding that weighing all evidence, intrinsic or 
5Second, and more importantly for current purposes, accused devices may infringe patents 
even when they do not fit within the exact limitations defined by the patent claim language itself.  
Were patent scope limited to the literal scope defined exactly by the language of patent claims, it 
would be possible for an alleged infringer to escape liability for infringement by making only a 
few very insubstantial changes to the patented invention.  There would be no infringement of the 
patent, since the alleged infringer would have produced a product outside the scope of the 
patent’s claims, but the infringer might still have practiced the patented invention nonetheless, 
because language is an imprecise tool for describing the highly technical concepts at issue in 
patent law.16 To keep this situation from arising, to keep people from “practice[ing] a fraud on a 
patent,”17 the doctrine of equivalents is used to provide the patentee with scope beyond the literal 
words of her patent claims and to the full extent of her actual invention. 
 When an accused infringer makes only insubstantial changes to a patented invention, he 
is said to have infringed the patent under the doctrine of equivalents, or to have committed 
equivalent infringement (as opposed to literal infringement).  Since Graver Tank, courts have 
generally (although not exclusively) used the “function-way-result” test to determine whether an 
accused device is equivalent to a given patent claim.18 Under this test, if the accused device 
achieves the same result as the patentee’s invention and does so by “perform[ing] substantially 
the same function in substantially the same way” as the patented invention, there may be 
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17 Id. at 608. 
18 Id. (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)) (“a patentee may invoke [the doctrine 
of equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a device ‘if it performs substantially the same function in 
substantially the same way to obtain the same result.’”) 
6equivalent infringement.19 Otherwise, the alleged infringer’s device has more than insubstantial 
changes from the patented invention, and there is no infringement. 
C. Legal Limitations on the Doctrine of Equivalents 
 Perhaps because it is such a broadly stated doctrine, the doctrine of equivalents is subject 
to some degree of abuse.  When applied, it offers patentees broader protection than they would 
be allowed under a strictly literal interpretation of their claim language, with the result that 
competitors seeking to design around the patent without committing infringement might have 
trouble ascertaining the actual scope of the patent’s claims.  For this reason, several legal 
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents have evolved.  Each limitation restricts the range of 
equivalents to which the patentee is entitled, controlling the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents so as to limit its adverse effects on public notice of patent claim scope. 
1. The All-Elements Rule 
In order to maximize the public notice of patent claim scope provided by claim language, 
any finding of equivalent infringement must be rooted in that language.  Thus, any determination 
of the scope of equivalents due a patent claim must take note of the language the patentee chose 
to use to define her invention; the doctrine of equivalents is meant only to correct for inevitable 
failures of language, not to substitute the court’s judgment for that of the patentee.  In order to 
ensure the patentee’s chosen language is not forgotten in determining the proper scope of 
equivalents, the courts have developed the all-elements rule. 
 Under the all-elements rule, the “function-way-result” test is to be applied to each 
individual claim limitation separately, rather than to the claim as a whole.20 This approach 
prevents the doctrine of equivalents from being used “to effectively eliminate [an] element in its 
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7entirety.”21 Since each patent claim comprises multiple elements or limitations, and since 
“[e]ach element contained in a patent claim is deemed material to defining the scope of the 
patented invention,”22 the equivalency test must be applied to each element separately.  Because 
the all-elements rule protects the materiality of each claim limitation, it is often described as a 
rule against vitiating a limitation. 
2. Prosecution History Estoppel 
As with the all-elements rule, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel exists to limit 
the application of the doctrine of equivalents.  The Supreme Court has held that “[p]rosecution 
history estoppel ensures that the doctrine of equivalents remains tied to its underlying purpose.”23 
It does so by ensuring that, if a patentee voluntarily surrenders material during patent 
prosecution, she cannot later reclaim that material under the doctrine of equivalents.24 Although 
the exact contours of the doctrine are still being shaped following the Festo decisions, 
prosecution history estoppel generally is applied after a court undertakes two inquiries.  First, the 
court must determine whether the patentee made a narrowing amendment to his claim during 
patent prosecution.25 Second, the court must determine whether the amendment was for a reason 
related to patentability.26 Festo held that an amendment made to cure any defect in the patent 
application was an amendment for reasons related to patentability.27 If an amendment was both 
narrowing and for patentability reasons, then prosecution history estoppel applies, and the 
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25 Id. at 736.  “Narrowing” in this context suggests that the patentee surrendered subject matter or equivalent 
structures that, in the absence of the amendment, he could have claimed. 
26 Id. 
27 Id. 
8patentee may be precluded from using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture any subject matter 
she surrendered via the amendment. 
3. Specification Dedication 
Another legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents is the doctrine of specification 
dedication, as laid out in the majority opinion in Johnson & Johnston Assocs. v. R.E. Serv. Co.28 
Under this doctrine, when the patentee discloses a range of possible equivalents in the patent’s 
specification but fails to claim some of them, she is deemed to have dedicated the unclaimed 
equivalents to the public.29 They cannot be reclaimed through the doctrine of equivalents. 
4. Prior Art Preclusion 
The doctrine of prior art preclusion provides an important and sometimes very broad 
limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.  Under the prior art preclusion doctrine, the patentee 
cannot use the doctrine of equivalents to gain protection for equivalent structures that are within 
the public domain, such as structures that are part of the prior art.30 This ensures that the 
doctrine of equivalents is not used to take knowledge out of the public domain in violation of the 
policy underpinning the patent system.  If an accused infringer can demonstrate that his allegedly 
equivalently infringing device is only practicing the prior art, he will be found not to infringe 
under the doctrine of equivalents, since the doctrine of prior art preclusion will prevent the 
patentee from gaining such broad protection.31 
28 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
29 Id. at 1054 (“when a patent drafter discloses but declines to claim subject matter . . . this action dedicates that 
unclaimed subject matter to the public”). 
30 Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assoc., 904 F.2d 677, 684 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“since prior art 
always limits what an inventor could have claimed, it limits the range of permissible equivalents of a claim”). 
31 Id. Note that the Federal Circuit has been clear that the burden is actually on the patentee to show that her claims 
as construed to cover the accused device under the doctrine of equivalents do not encompass any prior art, rather 
than on the accused infringer to demonstrate the opposite.  Id. at 685. 
95. Specification Estoppel 
Specification estoppel, sometimes referred to as the all-advantages rule, limits the 
doctrine of equivalents by requiring an infringing equivalent to provide all the specified 
advantages of the patented invention.  Thus, when a patentee discloses in the patent specification 
multiple functions performed by a given claim limitation, the accused device must perform all of 
those functions in order to be found to infringe the patent.32 
The doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, the topic of this article, would, if adopted, join 
this list of legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.  As discussed below, the Federal 
Circuit appears to have declined to create such a doctrine. 
 
II. SAGE PRODUCTS: THE GENESIS OF PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL?
The case of Sage Products, Inc. v. Devon Industries, Inc. dealt with alleged infringement 
of patents covering containers for safely “disposing of hazardous medical waste, including 
hypodermic needles.”33 In holding that the defendant did not infringe the plaintiff’s patents 
under the doctrine of equivalents, the Federal Circuit at first blush appeared to have created a 
new legal limitation on that doctrine.  To understand the new “patent drafter estoppel” doctrine, 
it is necessary to understand the facts of Sage Products.
Sage Products developed and patented “a disposal container”34 for medical waste.  The 
container was designed so that a user could dispose of the waste without coming into contact 
with any hazardous medical waste, such as used hypodermic syringes, already deposited in the 
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33 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1422. 
34 Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,779,728 (issued Oct. 25, 1988)). 
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container.35 To accomplish this, Sage Products designed its containers as closed vessels with 
elongated slots protected by a closure mechanism with two constrictions, one above the slot and 
one below it.36 
Sage Products’ claim language reflected its design.  As quoted by the court, the relevant 
patent claim read as follows: 
1. A disposal container comprising: 
a. a hollow upstanding container body, 
b. an elongated slot at the top of the container body for permitting access to the 
interior of the container body, 
c. barrier means disposed adjacent said slot for restricting access to the interior of 
said container body, at least a portion of said barrier means comprising: 
i. a first constriction extending over said slot, and 
ii. a complementary second constriction extending below said slot, and 
d. a closure disposed adjacent said slot.37 
The defendant in the case, Devon Industries, produced competing containers for 
disposing of hazardous medical waste.  Devon Industries’ containers were designed and 
constructed with a lid that could be lifted, exposing constrictions inside the container that 
allowed needles to be deposited in the container but did not allow a user to reach inside the 
container and contact previously disposed waste.38 However, because any structure that could be 
called an elongated slot in Devon Industries’ containers was located inside the container body, 
rather than “at the top of the container body,”39 as required by Sage Products’ patent, the court 
held that Devon Industries’ products did not literally infringe the patent.40 
As to equivalent infringement, the Federal Circuit noted that, since the Devon Industries’ 
product had its “first constriction,” “elongated slot,” and “second constriction” located inside the 
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37 Id. (citing U.S. Patent No. 4,779,728 (issued Oct. 25, 1988)) (emphasis in original). 
38 Id. at 1423. 
39 U.S. Patent No. 4,779,728 (issued Oct. 25, 1988). 
40 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1423. 
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container, rather than on top of the container, a finding of equivalent infringement would 
improperly eliminate the element of Sage Products’ claim that required the elongated slot to be 
located “at the top of the container body.”41 However, the court then went on to discuss the 
“inherent conflict between the role of the doctrine [of equivalents] in preventing ‘fraud on a 
patent’ and the primacy of the claims in defining the scope of a patentee’s exclusive rights.”42 
If the court did in fact create a new doctrine limiting the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents, it must have done so in this latter discussion.  In fact, the Federal Circuit did note 
that Sage Products’ patent covered “a relatively simple structural device.”43 Given this 
simplicity of design, “a skilled patent drafter would [have] foresee[n] the limiting potential of the 
‘over said slot’ limitation.”44 The inventor (or his patent attorney) was not prevented by any 
“subtlety of language or complexity of the technology”45 from drafting a broader claim that did 
not include this element.  Thus, given the relative simplicity of the invention, a reasonable 
inventor should have foreseen devices like the defendant’s product and could easily have drafted 
his claims more broadly, so as to cover that product literally.46 Given that Sage Products opted 
not to draft the claims this way, one could argue that they intended to exclude from their patent 
claim scope devices like that produced by Devon Industries.47 
This discussion could certainly be interpreted as creating a new legal limitation on the 
doctrine of equivalents.  At least with “relatively simple structural device[s],”48 like those at 
 
41 Id. at 1424. 
42 Id. (quoting Charles Greiner & Co. v. Mari-Med Mfg., Inc., 962 F.2d 1031, 1036 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
43 Id. at 1425. 
44 Id. 
45 Id. 
46 Id. (“If Sage [Products] desired broad patent protection for any container that performed a function similar to its 
claimed container, it could have sought claims with fewer structural encumbrances.”). 
47 Id. (“as between the patentee who had a clear opportunity to negotiate broader claims but did not do so, and the 
public at large, it is the patentee who must bear the cost of its failure to seek protection for this foreseeable alteration 
of its claimed structure”). 
48 Id. 
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issue in Sage Products, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel seems to create a foreseeability 
limitation.  While the doctrine of equivalents may apply, its application is limited, and protection 
is not granted against equivalent structures that the patentee reasonably should have foreseen but 
chose not to claim.  In fact, it is just this interpretation of Sage Products that excited the patent 
law bar shortly after the decision was handed down.49 However, as discussed below, the 
subsequent interpretation of this case by the Federal Circuit demonstrates that the doctrine of 
patent drafter estoppel does not exist. 
 
III. DIVERGENCE OF OPINION FOLLOWING SAGE PRODUCTS 
Following the decision in Sage Products, panels of the Federal Circuit appeared to back 
away from the new doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, although individual judges indicated in 
separate opinions that they believed such a doctrine had been created. 
A. Opinions Applying the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine 
 As ostensibly articulated in Sage Products, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel limits 
the application of the doctrine of equivalents by denying equivalent protection against structures 
that, while equivalent to the claimed invention, should have been foreseen by “a skilled patent 
drafter”50 who was not prevented by any “subtlety of language or complexity of the 
technology”51 from drafting a broader claim that would have covered the foreseen equivalent 
structure literally.  In two cases decided since Sage Products, separate opinions authored by 
Judge Rader have adopted this doctrine as a new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. 
 
49 See, e.g., Gambino & Paikoff, supra note 2, at 470. 
50 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425. 
51 Id. 
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1. Vehicular Technologies 
The case of Vehicular Technologies Corp. v. Titan Wheel International, Inc.52 is famous 
for articulating the all-advantages rule as a legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents.  
However, in a concurring opinion, Judge Rader argued that the case should have been decided on 
a different ground: the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel articulated in Sage Products, rather 
than the all-advantages rule, should have precluded the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents.53 
Vehicular Technologies dealt with improvements to automobile locking differentials,54 
and the relevant portion of the plaintiff’s patent claimed a portion of the invention as “two 
concentric springs bearing against one end of [a] pin.”55 The defendant’s product avoided this 
limitation by using “a single spring and a plug fitting into the spring”56 instead.  Although both 
Judge Rader and the panel majority found no infringement, either literal or equivalent, Judge 
Rader would have reached this result through the application of the patent drafter estoppel 
doctrine. 
 Judge Rader saw a direct parallel between Vehicular Technologies and Sage Products. In 
both cases, “a skilled patent drafter would readily foresee the limiting potential of” the relevant 
patent claim limitation.57 In neither case would the inventor or patent agent or attorney “confront 
the need for particularly subtle or ambiguous language.”58 Again, the patent drafter estoppel 
doctrine appears here as a foreseeability limitation.  If a reasonable inventor should have 
 
52 212 F.3d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2000). 
53 Id. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring). 
54 Id. at 1378-79. 
55 Id. at 1379 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,413,015 (issued May 9, 1995)). 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring). 
58 Id. 
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foreseen the defendant’s product and still chose not to claim so as to cover that product literally, 
the inventor cannot get patent protection against that product. 
 Judge Rader noted that the facts in Vehicular Technologies were particularly damning 
from a patent drafter estoppel perspective.  The plaintiff had initially learned of the defendant’s 
allegedly infringing product early enough that it could still have sought a broadening reissue of 
its patent, redrafting its claims so as to cover the defendant’s product literally.59 Here, the 
plaintiff made two errors from the perspective of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine.  First, it did 
not draft its claims broadly enough to cover products it should have foreseen.60 Second, even 
though it had an opportunity after learning of the infringement to redraft its claims to cover 
actual products of which it was aware, it failed to take advantage of that opportunity.61 
2. Johnson & Johnston Associates 
The majority in Johnson & Johnston Associates Inc. v. R.E. Service Co., Inc.62 used the 
case to help establish the rule that equivalent structures that appeared in the patent specification 
but were left unclaimed cannot give rise to liability under the doctrine of equivalents.63 As in 
Vehicular Technologies, though, Judge Rader authored a concurring opinion, this time joined by 
Chief Judge Mayer, arguing that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine should have been applied.64 
Johnson & Johnston Associates developed and patented a process for protecting large 
sheets of thin copper foil, used in manufacturing printed circuit boards, by attaching the foil to a 
sturdier metal substrate sheet.65 The patent specification described substrate sheets made of 
 
59 Id. (citing 35 U.S.C. § 251). 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 285 F.3d 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
63 Id. at 1054-55.  As the court noted, the specification dedication rule was first established in Maxwell v. J. Baker, 
Inc., 86 F.3d 1098, 1107 (Fed. Cir. 1996). 
64 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1056-59 (Rader, J., concurring). 
65 Id. at 1048-49 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,153,050 (issued Oct. 6, 1992)). 
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several materials, including aluminum, nickel alloys, stainless steel, and polypropylene.66 
However, the claim at issue referred specifically to aluminum substrates, omitting any reference 
to sheets made of other materials.67 
In his concurring opinion, Judge Rader once again employed the patent drafter estoppel 
doctrine to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents.  In terms even more explicit than 
those employed in his concurrence in Vehicular Technologies, he referred to patent drafter 
estoppel as a foreseeability limitation on the doctrine of equivalents: “the doctrine of equivalents 
does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the 
application process and included in the claims.”68 Adopting this reasoning would help to balance 
“the preeminent notice function of patent claims” against “the protective function of the doctrine 
of equivalents.”69 Judge Rader made clear his belief that what he termed a “foreseeability bar”70 
had already been adopted by the Federal Circuit in Sage Products.71 
Thus, in both Vehicular Technologies and Johnson & Johnston Associates, some Federal 
Circuit judges argued that the proper interpretation of Sage Products was that the case had 
created a new doctrine placing a legal limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents.  
This new doctrine precluded doctrine of equivalents protection against equivalent structures that 
the patentee reasonably should have foreseen during patent prosecution and neglected to claim 
literally.  However, as discussed below, the majority of the Federal Circuit judges do not agree 
with this reading of Sage Products; now that the case has been interpreted multiple times, it can 
be said with confidence that the proper interpretation of Sage Products is that it did nothing more 
 
66 Id. at 1050. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 1057 (Rader, J., concurring). 
71 Id. at 1057-58 (Rader, J., concurring). 
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than reaffirm and apply the all-elements rule precluding a patentee from using the doctrine of 
equivalents to entirely vitiate a claim limitation. 
B. Opinions Applying the All-Elements Rule 
 Under the Warner-Jenkinson all-elements rule, to equivalently infringe a patent, the 
accused device must have an equivalent to each element of the relevant patent claim.72 This 
requirement was not met in Sage Products, since any interpretation of the claim that found 
equivalents to all the structural pieces required under the claim required one or more of those 
structures to be in a location at odds with the patent claim.73 Under this interpretation of Sage
Products, the Federal Circuit did not actually create any new doctrine; it simply applied the 
uncontroversial all-elements rule.  The language in Sage Products that seems to create a doctrine 
barring patentees from seeking protection for objectively foreseeable equivalents is then dictum.  
This interpretation of the case has been adopted by the majority in several Federal Circuit cases. 
1. Overhead Door 
Perhaps the clearest expression of the all-elements rule interpretation of Sage Products 
comes in Overhead Door Corp. v. Chamberlain Group, Inc.74 This case involved a patent on 
improved automatic garage door openers.75 The patentee had developed and patented a system 
whereby a garage door opener could “learn” the codes associated with several transmitters; this 
prevented the installer or user from having to set DIP switches identically on each transmitter 
and on the garage door opener itself.76 The patent claimed a system for allowing the opener to 
learn the code associated with a transmitter that required the user to choose a memory location 
 
72 Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29-30. 
73 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1424 (“Each theory [of equivalent infringement] suffers from one of two alternative 
problems—either the elongated slot is not substantially “at the top of the container body” or there is no first 
constriction that extends substantially “over said slot.”). 
74 194 F.3d 1261 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
75 Id. at 1264 (citing U.S. Patent No. Re. 35,364 (issued Oct. 29, 1996)). 
76 Id. at 1264-65. 
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manually by setting a physical switch.77 However, the accused device accomplished this 
learning function automatically, using software to determine where in its memory to store the 
new transmitter code.78 The district court had granted summary judgment to the defendant, 
holding that the accused device did not infringe the patent either literally or under the doctrine of 
equivalents.79 
In reversing the district court, the Federal Circuit explicitly held that Sage Products did 
not limit the scope of equivalents available to the patentee.80 It described the earlier case as 
applying a doctrine preventing the use of the doctrine of equivalents to “utterly writ[e] out of the 
claim not one, but at least two (maybe more) express limitations of the claim.”81 The doctrine of 
equivalents argument was clearly precluded by the actual, express language of the claim at 
issue.82 This is an interpretation of Sage Products as applying the all-elements rule.  Noting that 
the plaintiff’s equivalence argument in Overhead Door did not require the complete vitiation of a 
claim element, the Federal Circuit remanded the case for consideration of the doctrine of 
equivalents issue.83 
Overhead Door did not expressly reject the patent drafter estoppel doctrine interpretation 
of Sage Products, but it did characterize the earlier case in a radically different way, as a simple 
application of the all-elements rule to “a relatively simple structural device.”84 However, if Sage 
Products actually did create a new doctrine limiting the application of the doctrine of 
equivalents, the Federal Circuit has been remarkably reluctant to apply that doctrine.  Overhead 
Door provided the court with an opportunity to interpret Sage Products as creating the doctrine 
 
77 Id. at 1265 (quoting U.S. Patent No. Re. 35,364). 
78 Id. at 1266. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. at 1271. 
81 Id. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (quoting Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425). 
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of patent drafter estoppel, but the court declined the invitation and instead merely applied an 
existing limitation on the doctrine of equivalents. 
2. Johnson & Johnston Associates 
As noted in Judge Rader’s concurrence, discussed above, the majority opinion in Johnson 
& Johnston Associates is consistent with either interpretation of Sage Products. The Federal 
Circuit held that, because the patentee in Johnson & Johnston Associates had disclosed several 
possible substrate materials but had chosen to claim only aluminum, there could be no doctrine 
of equivalents protection against a defendant whose products used one of the disclosed but 
unclaimed substrate materials.85 Judge Rader, in his concurring opinion, argued that doctrine of 
equivalents protection was unavailable because the disclosure of other substrate materials in the 
patent specification showed that those materials were foreseeable to the patentee at the time of 
application.86 However, the majority refused to go this far, holding instead that disclosure of an 
equivalent combined with a failure to claim that equivalent precluded protection for that 
equivalent because it showed a conscious decision on the part of the patentee to dedicate the 
disclosed and unclaimed subject matter to the public.87 
Johnson & Johnston Associates, then, is another example of the Federal Circuit’s 
reluctance to adopt patent drafter estoppel as a new legal limitation on the doctrine of 
equivalents.  As an en banc decision, it is highly indicative of the opinion of the court as a whole, 
rather than simply of a few renegade judges.  The Federal Circuit seems either to believe that no 
new doctrine was created in Sage Products or that the new doctrine should be subordinated to 
existing limits on the doctrine of equivalents. 
 
85 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1055. 
86 Id. at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
87 Id. at 1054-55. 
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3. Fin Control Systems 
The Federal Circuit also rejected the patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage
Products in Fin Control Systems Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc.88 This case involved a patent on 
removable fins for surfboards.89 In relevant part, the patentee had claimed a system for attaching 
the removable fins to a surfboard that involved parts of the fin being “laterally engage[ed] . . . 
[by] means applying lateral force to” those parts.90 The allegedly infringing product used a 
similar system that attached the removable fins to a surfboard at the front surface of the relevant 
structure (rather than at the left or right side, as would be required to meet the “operating 
laterally” limitation).91 
In holding that the accused product did not infringe the patent under the doctrine of 
equivalents, the Federal Circuit used Sage Products. The court affirmed the lower court’s 
holding that finding equivalent infringement “would improperly read the ‘lateral’ and ‘side’ 
limitations out of [the claim at issue].”92 In making this holding, the court cited Sage Products,
implicitly suggesting that the holding of that case related more to the rule against vitiating a 
claim limitation than to a new doctrine imposing a foreseeability limitation on the doctrine of 
equivalents.93 In a parenthetical comment, the court described Sage Products as holding that 
“reading limitations out of the claims, including by interpreting limitations in such a way that 
they do not have their normal meaning, is inappropriate in an analysis pursuant to the doctrine of 
equivalents,”94 a clear endorsement of the view that Sage Products merely applied the all-
 
88 265 F.3d 1311 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
89 Id. at 1313 (citing U.S. Patent No. 5,464,359 (issued Nov. 7, 1995)). 
90 Id. at 1316 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,464,359 (issued Nov. 7, 1995)).  The specification also included language 
with the same “operating laterally” limitation.  Id. at 1313 (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,464,359 (issued Nov. 7, 1995)) 
(“The tabs may be fixed within the plug recesses by means which laterally engage the tabs. . . .”). 
91 Id. at 1314. 
92 Id. at 1320. 
93 Id. (citing Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1424-26). 
94 Id. (citing Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1424-26). 
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elements rule rather than creating a new doctrine.  Even the language used by Judge Rader to 
support the patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage Products was appropriated by the 
majority in Fin Control Systems as support for the all-elements rule interpretation.95 
In Overhead Door and Johnson & Johnston Associates, the Federal Circuit majority was 
able to avoid adopting the patent drafter estoppel interpretation of Sage Products by applying an 
already-existing doctrine to limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents, leaving open the 
question of whether, under some circumstances, Sage Products might later be interpreted as 
Judge Rader suggested it should be.  Fin Control Systems forecloses this possibility, though, 
since the language that arguably could support the patent drafter estoppel interpretation is shown 
to be merely an amplification of the rule against entirely vitiating a claim limitation. 
4. SciMed Life Systems 
In SciMed Life Systems, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Systems, Inc.,96 the Federal 
Circuit clearly articulated its interpretation of the ambiguous language in Sage Products. The 
earlier case was described as having “determined that because the scope of the claim was limited 
in a way that plainly and necessarily excluded a structural feature that was the opposite of the 
one recited in the claim, that different structure could not be brought within the scope of patent 
protection through the doctrine of equivalents.”97 This interpretation makes no mention of a 
foreseeability limitation; rather the important inquiry under the SciMed Life Systems 
interpretation of Sage Products is whether the patent in some way “clearly exclude[s] certain 
subject matter, [thereby] implicitly disclaim[ing] the subject matter that was excluded.”98 
95 Id. at 1321 (quoting Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425) (“A skilled patent drafter would foresee the limiting 
potential of the [‘lateral’] limitation.”). 
96 242 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
97 Id. at 1346 (citing Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425; Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. v. U.S. Surgical Corp., 149 F.3d 
1309, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1998)). 
98 Id. 
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 From these cases, the appropriate interpretation of Sage Products can be derived.  Far 
from creating a new doctrine denying doctrine of equivalents protection to objectively 
foreseeable equivalents, as suggested by Judge Rader, the Federal Circuit merely reaffirmed the 
all-elements rule precluding a patentee from reclaiming under the doctrine of equivalents subject 
matter that was disclaimed under the literal claim language. 
 The cases interpreting Sage Products demonstrate the ways in which a patentee might 
disclaim subject matter that could not be reclaimed under the doctrine of equivalents.  In Johnson 
& Johnston Associates, the patentee declined to claim an allegedly equivalent structure, even 
though it described that structure in the patent specification.99 In Fin Control Systems, finding 
the defendant’s structures equivalent to the patent claim limitations would have required giving 
those limitations meanings widely divergent from their normal definitions.100 Sage Products,
then, merely provides yet another way in which a patentee can inadvertently disclaim subject 
matter: the patentee in Sage Products worded its claim such that finding an equivalent to one 
limitation necessarily required reading another limitation out of the claim.101 This is the correct 
interpretation of Sage Products in light of subsequent cases.  A patentee cannot recover via the 
doctrine of equivalents any subject matter that is disclaimed in her patent, either explicitly or 
implicitly.  Sage Products slightly expanded the all-elements rule; in addition to requiring an 
equivalent to each element, the rule post-Sage Products clearly also precludes eliminating one 
element in order to find an equivalent to another element. 
 
99 285 F.3d at 1050. 
100 265 F.3d at 1320. 
101 126 F.3d at 1424. 
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IV. SHOULD THE PATENT DRAFTER ESTOPPEL INTERPRETATION HAVE PREVAILED?
As is clear from the discussion above, the Federal Circuit has discarded the patent drafter 
estoppel interpretation of Sage Products, and no such foreseeability limitation on the application 
of the doctrine of equivalents appears to exist under current Federal Circuit jurisprudence.  Was 
this the correct interpretation?  The Federal Circuit had the opportunity after Sage Products to 
use the case to define a new doctrine requiring patentees to claim literally any equivalent 
structure that was reasonably foreseeable; was the court correct to decline to take this 
opportunity?  As shown below, these questions can be answered in the affirmative.  The court’s 
decision was correct both because it avoided creating intractable litigation problems and because 
it comports with relevant patent law policy. 
A. The Best Argument for the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine 
 As Judge Rader phrased it, the best argument for adopting the doctrine of patent drafter 
estoppel is that it greatly amplifies the degree to which patent claim language can notify the 
interested public of the actual scope of issued patents.102 This argument sounds reasonable in 
light of the enhancement to the public notice function provided by other legal limitations on the 
doctrine of equivalents.  In fact, while each of the patent system policies discussed above103 is 
advanced by some limitations on the doctrine of equivalents and restrained by others, the policy 
of providing the interested public with adequate notice of the scope of issued patents is 
uniformly advanced by all of the existing doctrines limiting the application of the doctrine of 
 
102 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring) (the principle that “the doctrine of 
equivalents does not capture subject matter that the patent drafter reasonably could have foreseen during the 
application process and included in the claims . . . enhances the notice function of claims by making them the sole 
definition of invention scope in all foreseeable circumstances”). 
103 See supra, notes 5–12 and accompanying text. 
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equivalents.104 When Judge Rader suggests that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine will provide 
a similar “enhance[ment of] the public notice function of claims,”105 he is relying on this 
presumed truism: the doctrine of equivalents limits the ability of the public to determine the 
scope of an issued patent from documents that are publicly available, such as the patent claims 
themselves, so any limitation on the application of the doctrine must increase public notice.  
However, as discussed below,106 the issue is not nearly this simple, and Judge Rader’s reliance 
proves ill-placed. 
1. Encouraging Significant Technological Advances 
 While limitations on the doctrine of equivalents consistently advance public notice, most 
of the doctrines limiting the doctrine of equivalents do not help to encourage significant, 
pioneering technical innovations, since these limiting doctrines generally operate by limiting the 
scope of protection available to the inventor, providing a smaller reward for creating a 
pioneering invention and thereby reducing the incentive to invent.  However, the doctrine of 
prior art preclusion does at least indirectly advance the policy of encouraging pioneering 
technical innovation.  The prior art preclusion doctrine precludes an inventor from receiving 
doctrine of equivalents protection against any equivalent structure which is a part of the prior 
art.107 Thus, this doctrine tends to encourage inventors to direct their efforts towards inventions 
that have few equivalents in the public domain.  Pioneering inventions, by definition, represent 
greater advances past the current state of the art than do inventions merely refining existing 
technology.  Thus, pioneering inventions are incentivized by the doctrine of prior art preclusion. 
 
104 See infra, notes 107–109 and accompanying text. 
105 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
106 See infra, notes 109 and accompanying text. 
107 Wilson Sporting Goods, 904 F.2d at 684. 
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 While the prior art preclusion doctrine helps advance the goal of encouraging significant 
technological advances, the other existing limitations on the doctrine of equivalents do not 
advance this goal.  Since the limiting doctrines have inconsistent effects on the goal of 
encouraging pioneering technical advances, and because most of these doctrines do not help 
achieve this goal, the advancement of this policy cannot be the driving force behind the legal 
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.  Like most of the limiting doctrines, the doctrine of 
patent drafter estoppel also does not encourage inventors to purse pioneering technical 
innovations. 
2. Encouraging Refinement through Imitation 
In contrast to the policy of encouraging significant technological advances, the 
limitations on the doctrine of equivalents generally do help achieve the goal of encouraging 
modest advances in technology and refinement through imitation.  In each case, the limiting 
doctrine increases public notice of the scope of issued patents, which makes it easier for 
inventors to improve upon previously patented inventions without fear of being accused of 
infringement. 
 Once again, the exception to the general trend is the doctrine of prior art preclusion.  This 
doctrine merely allows the public the freedom to practice the prior art where they might not 
otherwise be able to do so.  Since the prior art represents neither a significant technological 
advance nor a modest advance achieved through refinement, allowing the public to practice the 
prior art can hardly be said to advance either policy encouraging technological innovation.  
However, because prior art preclusion has a different effect on the goal of encouraging 
refinement through imitation than do the other legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents, 
this policy goal cannot be the chief driving force behind those limiting doctrines. 
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3. Preserving Knowledge Already in the Public Domain 
With the exception of prior art preclusion, none of the doctrines limiting the application 
of the doctrine of equivalents has any great effect on achieving the goal of denying patent 
protection for any knowledge already within the public domain.  For the most part, these legal 
limitations limit patent scope by denying protection to equivalent structures that are neither in the 
public domain nor protected under the literal language of the patent claims. 
 As with the policies of encouraging primary and secondary inventiveness, the exception 
here is again the doctrine of prior art preclusion.  By denying the patentee protection for 
equivalent structures that appear in the prior art and that are therefore in the public domain, this 
doctrine helps to preserve the integrity of the public domain.  Under the doctrine of prior art 
preclusion, patent protection is simply not available, under either a literal infringement or an 
equivalent infringement theory, for anything already available to the public. 
 Again, the various legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents have differing effects 
on the advancement of the policies at work in the patent system.  The doctrine of prior art 
preclusion advances the goal of denying protection for knowledge already within the public 
domain, while the remaining doctrines have no effect on the achievement of this goal.  Since the 
doctrines largely do not advance this policy, and since they have differing effects, protecting the 
integrity of the public domain cannot be the driving force behind limitations on the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
4. Encouraging Complete and Adequate Disclosure of Inventions 
Perhaps the most complicated set of effects on patent policy of the various doctrine of 
equivalents-limiting doctrines occurs in the area of encouraging complete disclosure of new 
inventions.  This policy does not drive the limits on the doctrine of equivalents, since the limiting 
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doctrines, to the extent they have any effect at all, generally have negative effects on the 
advancement of the goal of complete disclosure. 
 Neither the all-elements rule nor prior art preclusion has any significant effect on 
encouraging complete disclosure of inventions.  However, the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel negatively impacts the policy of encouraging inventors to disclose their inventions fully.  
By making greater disclosure during patent prosecution, the patentee provides later accused 
infringers with the ammunition needed to mount a defense based on prosecution history estoppel.  
Thus, greater disclosure results in a patent whose scope is more limited.  Patent applicants 
naturally seek the broadest patent protection possible, so the doctrine of prosecution history 
estoppel creates an incentive to disclose as little as possible. 
 The doctrine of specification dedication operates in a similar way.  By removing from the 
scope of an issued patent any equivalent structures that appear in the specification but not in the 
literal claim language, this doctrine creates an incentive for patentees to disclose no more than 
absolutely necessary for their claims to be allowed.  This is contrary to the patent policy of 
encouraging full disclosure of inventions. 
 While the doctrine of specification dedication might discourage a patentee from 
disclosing what he considers unpatentable equivalent structures, the doctrine of specification 
estoppel, or the all-advantages rule, creates an incentive for patent applicants to avoid disclosing 
all the advantages their design might possess.  Any advantage disclosed could potentially be used 
against the patentee later to limit the scope of protection afforded under the issued patent. 
 Thus, the policy of encouraging complete disclosure of inventions cannot be the chief 
driving force behind the various legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents.  At best, those 
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limiting doctrines have no effect on the advancement of the disclosure policy, and at worst they 
discourage efforts to achieve full disclosure. 
5. Increasing Public Notice of the Scope of Issued Patents 
The final patent law policy, that of ensuring that the interested public is well-informed of 
the scope of issued patents, is advanced by all of the doctrines that limit the application of the 
doctrine of equivalents.  This policy, then, must be the main driver behind the limitations, and an 
argument that the new doctrine of patent drafter estoppel advanced this policy would therefore be 
the best argument for the adoption of the new doctrine. 
 With the all-elements rule, the interested public is at least made aware of the elements 
that must be present to infringe an issued patent.  This allows later inventors seeking to design 
around the patent to focus their efforts on removing an element or creating a design with a non-
equivalent structure in place of a necessary element.  Without the all-elements rule, the doctrine 
of equivalents might be applied to a patent claim as a whole, greatly expanding the number of 
possible equivalent structures and making the exact scope of the patent claim difficult to 
ascertain.  Thus, the all-elements rule advances the patent system’s goal of increasing public 
notice of the scope of issued patents. 
 Similarly, the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel greatly advances the interested 
public’s knowledge of the scope of issued patents.  The doctrine limits the scope of issued 
patents based entirely upon the prosecution history, which is available to any interested member 
of the public.  The limitation is also applied in a mostly predictable way.  At the very least, with 
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel, the interested public knows that no equivalent 
structures disclaimed in the prosecution history may be claimed under the doctrine of 
equivalents. 
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 Specification dedication has a similar effect on the goal of increasing public notice of the 
scope of issued patents, although its effect is smaller than that of either the all-elements rule or 
the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel.  With the doctrine of specification dedication, 
competitors and other interested members of the public know for certain that any equivalent 
structure disclosed in the specification but not claimed is fair game for use in an invention that 
attempts to design around the patent in question.  Without the doctrine, these structures might be 
within the scope of patent protection under the doctrine of equivalents, and competitors might be 
forced to guess at the actual scope of the patent. 
 Similarly, the doctrine of prior art preclusion makes it clear to the interested public that 
any equivalent structure falling within the public domain may be incorporated into a later 
invention.  The rule helps to make the limits of patent scope clear to the public. 
 Finally, the doctrine of specification estoppel helps to increase public notice of the scope 
of issued patents by making the scope of patent protection depend upon the advantages disclosed 
in the specification.  The specification is public information, easily available to anyone aware of 
the patent.  The specification estoppel doctrine ensures that the publicly-known specification is 
tied to the scope of patent protection, increasing public notice of the patent’s scope. 
 Thus, the existing doctrines that limit the application of the doctrine of equivalents all 
advance the patent system’s goal of increasing public notice of the scope of issued patents.  If 
there is an argument to be made for the adoption of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, it must 
be that it also helps achieve this goal.  This is exactly what the proponents of the new doctrine 
suggest.  In his concurrence in Johnson & Johnston Associates, Judge Rader suggests that 
adopting the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would “enhance[] the notice function of claims.”108 
The reasoning behind this view is simple and, at first glance, beguiling.  The doctrine of 
 
108 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring). 
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equivalents provides a patentee with a broader scope of protection than mere literal interpretation 
of his patent claims would allow.  This excess protection is ill-defined, since its contours are 
never explicitly located and are held to encompass a particular device only after extensive 
litigation.  Thus, the doctrine of equivalents is a barrier to achieving complete public notice of 
the scope of patent claims.  Any limitation on the application of the doctrine of equivalents, then, 
must increase public notice.  As shown below,109 even this best argument for the adoption of the 
patent drafter estoppel doctrine does not hold up under closer scrutiny. 
B. Litigation Implications of the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine 
 Had the Federal Circuit created a new patent drafter estoppel doctrine in Sage Products,
it would have created serious problems for patent infringement litigants and for courts 
adjudicating patent infringement cases.  Thus, the court made the correct decision when it 
declined to interpret its Sage Products decision as creating such a doctrine. 
 To understand the problems the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would create in patent 
infringement litigation, one need only recognize that the doctrine would require the court to 
assess whether a given structure, found to be equivalent to a limitation contained in the patent 
claim at issue, would have been foreseeable to the reasonable inventor at the time the patentee 
applied for her patent.110 The term of a patent generally ends 20 years after date on which the 
patent’s application was filed.111 Thus, a foreseeability determination under the patent drafter 
estoppel doctrine might be made as long as 20 years after the date on which the foreseeability is 
to be evaluated.112 In many cases, the patent itself would offer insufficient evidence to determine 
 
109 See infra, note 140, and accompanying text. 
110 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring); Vehicular Technologies, 212 F.3d at 
1384 (Rader, J., concurring). 
111 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2000). 
112 In fact, given that litigation in patent infringement cases can be lengthy, the determination may occur even later 
than this. 
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exactly what was foreseeable at the time the patent was prosecuted.  Thus, expert testimony 
would be needed, creating a significant new expense for litigants on both sides and requiring 
judges and juries to assess the credibility of witnesses in an entirely new area. 
 In many ways, the foreseeability determinations that would need to be made under the 
patent drafter estoppel doctrine resemble the determinations that courts already struggle with in 
the area of patent obviousness.  Obviousness determinations require the court to investigate 
whether the invention “would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person 
having ordinary skill in the art to which [the invention] pertains.”113 This is similar to the 
foreseeability determination that the patent drafter estoppel doctrine would require, because it 
forces courts to evaluate the knowledge of typical practitioners in a relevant field at a point in 
time remote from that when the determination is made. 
 Given that the two determinations are qualitatively similar, they might be expected to 
experience similar pitfalls.  For example, in determining whether an invention is obvious, courts 
have been warned against using hindsight, since all inventions seem more obvious after they are 
made than they did beforehand.114 To ensure that the disclosure of the patentee’s own invention 
is not used against her in order to render the invention obvious, courts have developed “objective 
evidence of nonobviousness,”115 factors which must be considered when making an obviousness 
determination.  These factors include “commercial success, long felt but unsolved needs, [and] 
failure of others,”116 and, “when present [they must] always be considered as an integral part of 
the analysis.”117 
113 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000). 
114 W.L. Gore & Associates, Inc. v. Garlock, Inc., 721 F.2d 1540, 1553 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (holding that courts should 
avoid “fall[ing] victim to the insidious effect of a hindsight syndrome wherein that which only the invention taught 
is used against its teacher.”). 
115 Id. (citing In re Sernaker, 702 F.2d 989, 996 (Fed. Cir. 1983)). 
116 Graham, 383 U.S. at 17. 
117 W.L. Gore & Associates, 721 F.2d at 1555. 
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 Determination of a given equivalent structure’s foreseeability at the time of patenting 
would suffer from a similar problem.  At the time of litigation, the defendant (and possibly others 
as well) will have developed the equivalent in question.  It is not difficult to imagine the 
existence of the equivalent structure offering courts an opportunity to improperly use hindsight 
to determine that a reasonable inventor should have been able to foresee the equivalent at the 
time the patent was applied for.  Objective considerations similar to those used in obviousness 
determinations would need to be developed, and these considerations would greatly add to the 
length and complexity of patent infringement litigation. 
 The difficulty inherent in making foreseeability determinations in patent infringement 
cases is not immediately apparent from the cases in which Judge Rader argued that the patent 
drafter estoppel doctrine should be applied.  Sage Products, Vehicular Technologies, and 
Johnson & Johnston Associates all involved patents that provided completely intrinsic evidence 
of objective foreseeability of equivalents, making resort to evidence outside the patent 
unnecessary.  In Sage Products, the invention was “a relatively simple structural device,”118 
something that surely is not guaranteed in all doctrine of equivalents cases.  A much more 
complicated invention would lead to foreseeability determinations that were more difficult to 
make and therefore required much more information and a greater commitment of judicial 
resources. 
 In Johnson & Johnston Associates, the equivalents in question were actually disclosed in 
the specification without being claimed.119 Clearly, if the patentee itself knew enough about the 
equivalent substrate materials to disclose them at the time it filed its patent application, those 
equivalent materials were foreseeable.  Thus, the foreseeability determination in Johnson & 
 
118 Sage Products, 126 F.3d at 1425. 
119 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1050. 
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Johnston Associates was trivial, masking the difficulty of the determination process in the typical 
patent infringement case. 
 Similarly, the patentee in Vehicular Technologies was aware of the defendant’s 
equivalent structure very shortly after receiving its patent, since it had the opportunity to seek a 
broadening reissue that encompassed the defendant’s product in its literal claim language.120 The 
period during which a broadening (as opposed to a narrowing) reissue can be sought is only “two 
years from the grant of the original patent.”121 Development of an equivalent within such a short 
time period may suggest that, at the time the patent was issued, there is a good chance that the 
equivalent technology was foreseeable.  Such circumstances are unlikely to be present in all 
doctrine of equivalents cases, though.  Judge Rader’s patent drafter estoppel doctrine may be 
capable of being applied in cases where foreseeability determinations are so easy to make, but its 
application in more complicated cases would likely be much more impractical.  Given that 
similar limits on the doctrine of equivalents are possible using only already-existing doctrines, 
the need for such an expensive and cumbersome new doctrine seems unclear. 
C. Policy Implications of the Patent Drafter Estoppel Doctrine 
 In addition to creating serious practical problems for litigants and courts, the adoption of 
the patent drafter estoppel would be detrimental to the policies underlying the patent law system.  
Those policies include encouraging significant technological advances,122 encouraging secondary 
advances in technology that build upon prior significant advances,123 ensuring that no knowledge 
is removed from the public domain,124 encouraging dissemination of technological information 
 
120 Vehicular Technologies, 212 F.3d at 1384 (Rader, J., concurring). 
121 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000). 
122 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146-47. 
123 Id. at 146. 
124 Graham, 383 U.S. at 6. 
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via disclosure of new inventions,125 and ensuring that the scope of issued patents is clear so that 
competitors can operate without committing infringement.126 The patent drafter estoppel 
doctrine generally does a poor job of advancing these policy goals, compared with simple 
application of existing legal limitations on the doctrine of equivalents. 
1. Encouraging Significant Technological Advances 
A primary purpose of the patent law system is to encourage significant, pioneering 
technological advances.127 This goal is achieved “by securing . . . to . . . Inventors the exclusive 
Right to their . . . Discoveries.”128 Because the patentee has a right to exclude others from 
practicing the invention, she can invest time, money, and effort in opening a new area of 
technology, secure in the knowledge that her patent will allow her to recoup her investment 
through sales in a market where no one else is allowed to compete without first getting her 
permission.  Because it depends for its advancement upon the creation of a patent monopoly, the 
goal of encouraging pioneering inventions is most greatly advanced when the terms of that 
monopoly are most favorable to the inventor.  Thus, any restriction in the subject matter the 
patentee may protect under her patent reduces the incentive to invent and acts as a barrier to 
achieving the policy goal of encouraging pioneering technological advances. 
 From the perspective of this policy, the doctrine of equivalents is a useful tool.  At worst, 
it ensures that the patent right is not completely gutted of all meaning, since it allows the 
patentee to defend her patent rights even when an infringer makes a few insubstantial changes to 
the invention.  At most, it allows the patentee somewhat broader coverage than she would be 
allowed under her literal language.  Either way, the scope of the patentee’s right to exclude is 
 
125 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
126 Id.; Wabash Appliance, 304 U.S. at 369. 
127 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146-47. 
128 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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greater with the doctrine of equivalents than without it.  The doctrine of equivalents thus helps to 
encourage the development of significant and pioneering inventions. 
 If the doctrine of equivalents helps achieve the policy goal of encouraging significant 
technological advances, any legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents must frustrate that 
goal.  This is not to suggest that some limits are not necessary.  After all, the language of the 
claims is paramount, and the doctrine of equivalents cannot be used to grant the patentee 
protection against equivalent structures that are clearly excluded by her chosen claim 
language.129 However, the imposition of a new legal limitation, such as that represented by the 
patent drafter estoppel doctrine, is contrary to the policy of encouraging inventors to invest time 
and effort in developing pioneering technological advances. 
2. Encouraging Secondary Technological Advances 
The patent system seeks to encourage significant and pioneering technological 
innovations, but this is not the only goal of the system.  It is balanced against “the recognition 
that imitation and refinement through imitation are both necessary to invention itself and the very 
lifeblood of a competitive economy.”130 This balance recognizes that an important goal of the 
patent system is to encourage inventors to build upon the earlier advances of others.  The patent 
system is designed to achieve this goal by requiring patentees to disclose their inventions before 
being granted patent protection.  The disclosure of new inventions helps educate the interested 
public about the current state of the art, suggesting new avenues of inquiry and providing a 
baseline for further innovation. 
 Unlike the encouragement of primary innovation, the goal of encouraging secondary 
innovation is frustrated by a strong doctrine of equivalents.  If the doctrine of equivalents is 
 
129 SciMed Life Systems, 242 F.3d at 1345 (“A particular structure can be deemed outside the reach of the doctrine of 
equivalents because that structure is clearly excluded from the claims. . . .”). 
130 Bonito Boats, 489 U.S. at 146. 
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relatively unrestricted, patentees may use it to foreclose experimentation by others in areas 
closely related to the patented technology (but outside the literal claim language).  By contrast, a 
closely circumscribed doctrine of equivalents allows secondary inventors to focus their efforts in 
technical areas very closely related to the patent in question without running the risk of 
infringing the patent.  Thus, any legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents will help to 
achieve the goal of encouraging secondary innovation via “refinement through imitation.”131 
As a new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, then, the doctrine of patent 
drafter estoppel could be expected to advance the policy goal of encouraging secondary 
innovation.  Assuming that patentees would not radically change their claim drafting strategy in 
response to the new limitation, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel would limit the range of 
equivalents available to a patent holder.  Since fewer equivalent structures would therefore be 
protected under the patent, the patentee would have less ability to interfere with later innovators 
operating in closely related areas.  With greater freedom to investigate related technologies, 
secondary innovators would be more encouraged to continue their work were the Federal Circuit 
to adopt the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel. 
3. Ensuring No Knowledge is Removed from the Public Domain 
In addition to balancing the encouragement of primary and secondary invention, the 
patent law system also has several other policy goals, including ensuring that no invention or 
knowledge becomes protected under a patent once it has entered the public domain.132 Neither 
the doctrine of equivalents nor its associated legal limitations have any significant effect on the 
achievement of this policy goal. 
 
131 Id. 
132 Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (“Congress may not authorize the issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent 
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access to materials already available.”). 
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 The classic operation of the doctrine of equivalents allows a patentee protection against 
products developed during his patent term that use technology that did not exist at the time the 
patent was applied for and issued, if those products accomplish the same result as the invention 
and do so in substantially the same way in order to carry out substantially the same function.133 
This simply gives the patentee protection against any embodiment of his invention, rather than 
only the subset of embodiments that can be easily described at the time the patent is prosecuted.  
The operation of the doctrine of equivalents has no effect on the removal of knowledge from the 
public domain, since this goal is achieved or frustrated at the time a patent is issued.  Once the 
patent is issued, its scope is fixed, and any knowledge that will be removed from the public 
domain because of the patent is removed from the public domain at that point.  While the 
operation of the doctrine of equivalents determines exactly what the scope of the patent will be, 
it is the issuance of the patent, rather than the exact scope of the patent, that determines whether 
knowledge is taken out of the public domain and made subject to patent protection. 
 Because the doctrine of equivalents itself has no effect on the advancement or frustration 
of the policy goal of ensuring that no knowledge already in the public domain becomes protected 
by a patent, no legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents can affect the achievement of this 
goal.  As a legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, patent drafter estoppel would therefore 
be neutral with respect to ensuring that knowledge in the public domain remains there. 
 
133 Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 607 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters, 280 U.S. 30, 42 (1929)) (“a patentee 
may invoke [the doctrine of equivalents] to proceed against the producer of a device ‘if it performs substantially the 
same function in substantially the same way to obtain the same result.’”); see, e.g., Hughes Aircraft Co. v. United 
States, 140 F.3d 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (doctrine of equivalents provided protection against satellite incorporating 
recently-developed computer technology to accomplish on board the same function that the patent claimed would be 
performed by satellite operator on the ground). 
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4. Encouraging Full Disclosure of New Inventions 
The patent system is designed to encourage full disclosure of new inventions, since this 
helps to ensure that society gets the maximum informational benefit from the patent quid pro 
quo.134 This goal focuses not on the patent claims, but rather on the patent specification, where 
the patentee is to provide a complete description of the invention sufficient “to enable any person 
skilled in the art to which [the invention] pertains . . . to make and use the [invention].”135 The 
doctrine of equivalents, as an infringement doctrine, does not create any significant incentive 
either for or against full disclosure, since it focuses in its operation on the patent’s claims and the 
accused device. 
 However, the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, if adopted, might create an incentive not to 
disclose inventions absolutely fully.  In determining whether a given equivalent structure was 
foreseeable at the time the patent in question was prosecuted, a court will need contemporary 
evidence, and the court will likely find it necessary to examine the patent specification as a 
portion of that contemporary evidence.  Judge Rader’s concurrence in Johnson & Johnston 
Associates provides a clear example of this tendency.  There, the evidence that substrate 
materials other than aluminum were foreseeable at the time of patent prosecution was provided 
by the patent specification’s reference to other substrate materials, including steel, the material 
used by the defendant.136 Without a broad disclosure like that in Johnson & Johnston 
Associates, it would be more difficult for a court conclusively to determine that a particular 
equivalent should have been foreseen. 
 Thus, were patent drafter estoppel to be adopted, unscrupulous patentees would have a 
reason to hide equivalent structures that they foresaw by failing to disclose them at all.  In this 
 
134 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000). 
135 Id. This is known as the enablement requirement. 
136 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1050. 
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way, they could ensure that full disclosure could not be used against them later.  Patent 
applicants and their agents or attorneys would operate under the maxim “Aut tace, aut loquere 
meliora silentio.”137 The goal of encouraging full disclosure of inventions to ensure that society 
receives the maximum return for its grant of monopoly power would be frustrated. 
5. Providing Adequate Public Notice of the Scope of Issued Patents 
The final policy underlying the patent system is that proper notice should be given to the 
public of the existence of issued patents and the scope of those patents.138 This notice is 
necessary to allow competitors the opportunity to conduct their business without infringing the 
patent, and it assists secondary innovators in determining what areas of technology need 
investigation and which areas are closed to further investigation because they are the subject of 
patent protection. 
 To a certain degree, the doctrine of equivalents frustrates this policy goal.  If patents 
could only be infringed by producing devices falling within the literal claim language, the scope 
of patent protection would be eminently clear.  By creating a penumbra of protection 
surrounding the literal claim language, though, the doctrine of equivalents reduces the ease with 
which the scope of an issued patent can be determined.  Competitors and secondary innovators 
must make their best guess as to what similar techniques, structures, and approaches the courts 
will deem equivalent.139 If they are particularly risk-averse, competitors and secondary 
innovators will structure their activities so as to avoid any conceivably equivalent device, greatly 
 
137 “Be quiet, unless your speech be better than silence.”  See National Gallery, London, Self Portrait of Salvator 
Rosa (c. 1645), at http://www.nationalgallery.org.uk/cgi-bin/WebObjects.dll/CollectionPublisher.woa/wa/ 
work?workNumber=NG4680 (last visited Mar. 26, 2005). 
138 Johnson & Johnston Associates, 285 F.3d at 1056 (Rader, J., concurring) (describing patent claims as “providing 
the public with adequate notice of potentially infringing behavior.”) (quoting Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29). 
139 This is perhaps not quite as bad as it sounds, since even in the absence of the doctrine of equivalents, competitors 
seeking to operate in technical areas near the patent without infringing it will need to make their best guess as to the 
way a court will construe the literal claim language. 
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restricting the amount of further research and “refinement through imitation” that the patent 
system is supposed to encourage. 
 Since the doctrine of equivalents frustrates the policy goal of providing adequate public 
notice of the scope of issued patents, any limitation on the doctrine of equivalents should help 
achieve that goal.140 However, one should resist the temptation to think that all legal limitations 
on the doctrine of equivalents are equally effective in reducing the size of the penumbra 
surrounding the literal claim language.  In fact, the doctrine of patent drafter estoppel, if adopted, 
might make matters worse rather than better. 
 The concern with the doctrine of equivalents is that it does not permit competitors to 
determine the best course of action to avoid infringement a priori, because the determination of 
which structures are equivalent to the claim limitations at issue can be accomplished only by a 
court after the fact.  The adoption of the patent drafter estoppel doctrine as a limitation on the 
doctrine of equivalents would not eliminate this problem, since the doctrine of equivalents would 
still be operable.  The new doctrine would merely add yet another post facto inquiry to the 
doctrine of equivalents analysis.  As with claim construction, determination of the foreseeability 
of a particular equivalent requires consideration of evidence not a part of the public record, such 
as expert witness testimony.  The determination of whether an equivalent structure was 
objectively foreseeable at the time the patent in question was prosecuted simply cannot be 
carried out by a competitor or secondary innovator seeking the appropriate course of action; it 
must be accomplished by a court after the fact. 
 Without the patent drafter estoppel doctrine, a party interested in avoiding patent 
infringement need only make two guesses as to the scope of the patent.  First, the party must try 
to determine how the patent claims will be construed.  Second, the party must guess what 
 
140 See supra, note 109, and accompanying text. 
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structures will be held equivalent to the limitations of the claims as construed.  The party may 
then proceed with its business in such a way that it does not use any structures that it believes 
will fall within either the construed literal claim language or the scope of equivalents to the 
claims. 
 Were the patent drafter estoppel doctrine to be adopted, competitors and secondary 
innovators would still be required to make these same inquiries before undertaking any activity 
within a technology area closely related to that covered by the patent in question.  They would 
also need to make an additional guess about what a court would hold, though: in addition to 
trying to determine whether a contemplated structure would be fall within the literal claim 
language or would be considered equivalent to a claim limitation, they would be required to 
guess whether the court would find the structure an objectively foreseeable technological 
development.  The patent drafter estoppel doctrine thus increases the uncertainty surrounding the 
scope of issued patents, rather than decreasing it.  The doctrine runs contrary to the policy goal 
of ensuring that there is adequate public notice of the scope of issued patents. 
 The patent drafter estoppel doctrine, then, generally would cause more problems than it 
would solve.  The need for objective indicia of foreseeability and the requirement for additional 
extrinsic evidence would greatly complicate patent infringement litigation.  At the cost of 
making litigation more cumbersome, no policy goal of the patent law system would be advanced 
more than moderately, and more goals would be frustrated than would be advanced.  The policy 
goals of encouraging significant and pioneering technological advances, encouraging full 
disclosure of new inventions, and ensuring that there is adequate public notice of the scope of 
protection under issued patents would all be frustrated by the adoption of the patent drafter 
estoppel doctrine.  The doctrine is neutral as to the policy goal of ensuring patent protection is 
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not given to any knowledge already within the public domain.  It would only advance the goal of 
encouraging secondary innovation via “refinement through imitation.”  The advancement of this 
single goal is not worth the frustration of several other policies, particularly when one considers 
the additional litigation costs that would be incurred were the doctrine to be adopted. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The Sage Products decision presented the Federal Circuit with an opportunity to adopt a 
new legal limitation on the doctrine of equivalents, the patent drafter estoppel doctrine.  This 
new doctrine would have limited the application of the doctrine of equivalents by precluding 
equivalent infringement protection for any equivalent structure that the patentee reasonably 
should have foreseen during patent prosecution.  Since Sage Products, the Federal Circuit 
appears to have declined the invitation to create this new foreseeability limitation on the doctrine 
of equivalents.  This course of action was wise, because the patent drafter estoppel doctrine 
would have caused patent infringement litigation to grow more cumbersome and expensive with 
no corresponding increase in the advancement of patent law policy goals.  In fact, the new 
doctrine would have frustrated more patent system policies than it advanced.  In short, the 
doctrine of patent drafter estoppel is dead and should stay dead. 
